ABSTRACT Temporally correlated trajectories are ubiquitous, and it has been a challenging problem to protect the temporal correlation from being used against users' privacy. In this paper, we propose an optimal Pufferfish privacy mechanism to achieve better data utility while providing guaranteed privacy of temporally correlated daily trajectories. First, a Laplace noise mechanism is realized through geometric sum of noisy Fourier coefficients of temporally correlated daily trajectories. Then, we prove that the proposed noisy Fourier coefficients' geometric sum satisfies Pufferfish privacy, i.e., the so-called FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism. Furthermore, we achieve better data utility for a given privacy budget by solving a constrained optimization problem of the noisy Fourier coefficients via the Lagrange multiplier method. What is more, a rigorous mathematical formula has been obtained for the Fourier coefficients' Laplace noise scale parameters. At last, we evaluate our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism on both simulated and real-life data and find that our proposed mechanism achieves better data utility and privacy compared with the other stateof-the-art existing approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, many real-world applications, such as maps, points of interest searching and taxi reservation, generate, store and process a large amount of temporally correlated trajectories. Releasing these trajectories makes it possible for researchers to predict users' behavior trend [1] and monitor traffic [2] by utilizing temporal correlations of users, i.e., relations between locations at different timestamps.
Although temporal correlations of users' trajectories are useful to the researchers and many service applications such as travel recommendations [1] , they may cause a privacy risk [3] . With background knowledge, adversaries may mine individuals' privacy through the temporal correlations of their trajectories. For example, as shown in Figure 1 , once trajectories are released to untrusted service providers, they may compute the temporal correlation of a user's trajectories. Then the adversaries could infer the user's mobility pattern, e.g., Alice, with their background knowledge about Alice's temporal correlation. Furthermore, they may analyze her privacy such as home address and work address.
The problem of privacy-preserving trajectories releasing has attracted extensive interests of many researchers. As direct solutions, dummy trajectories [4] , suppression [5] , [6] and k-anonymity [7] have been adopted to protect trajectory privacy. Unfortunately, they cannot resist composition attack [8] , deFinetti attack and background knowledge attack [9] . To overcome this, differential privacy [10] is considered to achieve privacy-preserving trajectory publication [11] , [12] because adversaries cannot judge whether individuals are in the database or not. Nevertheless, these solutions do not consider the issue of temporal correlations of trajectories.
In order to protect individuals' privacy under the assumption that there are temporal correlations within trajectories, several works have attempted to consider the relations between locations for differentially private trajectory releasing. For the privacy-preserving aggregate information releasing, first, the prefix tree [13] is adopted to achieve such goal. Then, the n-gram model [14] is introduced to protect correlation privacy. Recently, Markov model [15] is utilized to achieve differentially private correlation protection for trajectories. For a single trajectory releasing, the sum of many copies of Gaussian white noise [3] is adopted to generate correlated Laplace noise for protecting trajectories' temporal correlations, i.e., the so-called Correlated Time-Series (CTS) privacy protection. Furthermore, based on Markov model, Pufferfish privacy [16] is adopted to protect the temporal correlations within trajectories [17] . Although these solutions can protect temporal correlations efficiently, they do not consider to optimize data utility for a given privacy budget.
It has been a task of great challenge to handle such individuals' privacy induced by the temporal correlations. On one hand, Differential Privacy (DP) cannot be directly applied to temporally correlated trajectories. Although a Pufferfish privacy mechanism can handle such kind of trajectories, to the best of our knowledge, there is no rigorous mathematics formulation of a Pufferfish privacy mechanism dedicated to the temporal correlation privacy problem. On the other hand, to have an efficient Pufferfish privacy mechanism, it is preferred that a rigorous mathematics formula of the noise scale parameters can also be obtained to achieve the optimal data utility with a guaranteed privacy. To fill in such gap, in this paper, we propose a Laplace noisy mechanism, satisfying Pufferfish privacy, for protecting the individuals' privacy against adversarial inferencing through their trajectories' temporal correlations.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
• We propose a noise mechanism for efficient generation of Laplace noise via the Fourier coefficients' geometric sum to achieve ε-Pufferfish privacy, i.e., the FGSPufferfish privacy mechanism.
• We present an analytical formula of the optimized the Fourier coefficients noise for the constrained optimization problem of achieving a better data utility for a given privacy budget. Then, we provide theoretical analysis of the data utility and privacy, as well as the posterior-toprior knowledge gain of an adversary.
• We evaluate the proposed FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism over both simulated and real-life datasets.
The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed mechanism does achieve better privacy and data utility than the state-of-the-art existing approach. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review the related work in the literature. In Section III, we formally define our problem, and then introduce some background knowledge, including Pufferfish privacy, discrete Fourier transform and its inverse transform, geometric sum, and the constrained optimization problem. Then, in Section IV, we explain the relation between the mobility pattern and temporal correlations, and mathematically quantify the temporal correlation of a trajectory and the corresponding temporal correlation's discrete Fourier transform. In Section V, we introduce our proposed FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism. Furthermore, data utility, privacy analyses and the adversary's posterior-toprior knowledge gain are depicted in Section VI. The privacypreserving trajectory releasing algorithm based on the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism is outlined in Section VII. In Section VIII, the experimental performance evaluations are shown. Finally, Section IX concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Releasing temporally correlated raw trajectories poses a serious privacy problem, due to potential sensitive information leak linked to the temporal correlation. In this section, we review some literature about the privacy-preserving trajectories releasing.
Gao et al. [18] , [19] reviewed different methods for trajectory privacy. At the beginning, researchers proposed dummy trajectories [4] , suppression technique [5] , [6] , techniques based on k-anonymity [7] and their variants to protect privacy in trajectories. Unfortunately, these approaches cannot prevent inferencing attack well if the locations are in sensitive areas. Researchers also adopted differential privacy to protect trajectory privacy. Rastogi and Nath [11] proposed the Fourier Perturbation Algorithm (FPA) using Fourier transform, without considering the temporal correlations in a trajectory. Jiang et al. [12] proposed a noisy position mechanism for each position, satisfying (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and a noisy coordinate mechanism whose Laplace scale of the longitude is the same as that of the latitude, satisfying ε-differential privacy, respectively. Then they proposed an ε-differentially private exponential mechanism through sampling suitable distance and director for trajectory publication. Riboni and Bettini [20] proposed a trajectory privacy protection in a context-aware recommending system by combining the (L, j)-density with ε-differential privacy. Quan et al. [21] proposed a trajectory obfuscation mechanism based on the Laplace mechanism. In this mechanism, a polar Laplace noise is added on the trajectories. Zhang et al. [22] proposed a noise generation strategy based on the time-series pattern in order to protect individual privacy within the cloud framework. Cao and Yoshikawa [23] proposed an -trajectory privacy model to protect a trajectory whose length is . This model satisfies ε-differential privacy for releasing real-time statistics of trajectory streams. Under the assumption of no temporal correlation, Hua et al. [9] designed an exponential mechanism to select a group divided by the distances between locations at each timestamp and proposed a Laplace mechanism of noisy counts for differentially private trajectory publication. Furthermore, Li et al. [24] proposed a differentially private location generation algorithm and a bounded Laplace mechanism for trajectories releasing. Besides, Bindschaedler and Shokri [25] generated fake trajectories by utilizing the correlations between locations for privacy-preserving trajectory releasing. Moreover, these approaches also do not consider trajectories' temporal correlations which could leak individual privacy.
However, an adversary may utilize the temporal correlation to build a user's mobility pattern and thus infer the user's trajectory [1] , [2] . There are several works dealing with such spatio-temporal correlation. On one hand, researches considered privacy-preserving aggregate information releasing. Chen et al. [13] proposed a data-dependent solution by recursively constructing a noisy prefix tree based on the existed trajectory data, for trajectory statistics publishing. However, with the growth of the prefix tree, this solution will lead to poor data utility. To solve this problem, Chen et al. [14] proposed a differentially private trajectory statistics publishing method by using the variable n-gram model. He et al. [26] proposed a trajectory systhesis method, called ''DPT'', according to the correlations between locations within a single trajectory. They considered individual movements' speeds and constructs prefix tree counts ensuring ε-differential privacy. Then, based on this approach, they presented a tool, called ''VisDPT'' [27] , helping data curators understand privacy problems for data releasing and their proposed privacy protecting mechanism. Fan et al. [28] utilized road networking, overall population density and so on to model the correlations at per timestamps and adopted Quadtree to deal with the sparsity of trajectories for differentially private aggregate releasing, respectively. Furthermore, a set of novel techniques are based on the Markov assumption. Wang and Sinnott [15] proposed a private reference system by cluster-based anchor points under the X-order Markov assumption. The raw trajectories are discrete in this system. Then noisy calibrated trajectories are released by using differentially private prefix trees.
On the other hand, researchers generated privacypreserving trajectories to protect temporal correlations. Wang and Xu [3] adopted Gaussian white noise to protect a trajectory's temporal correlation. Ou et al. [29] proposed differentially private trajectory releasing by using Hidden Markov model. To deal with the weakness of differential privacy, Song et al. [17] proposed the Markov Quilt Mechanism (MQM) under the Pufferfish privacy framework to protect the spatio-temporal correlation within a single trajectory. Although these works consider the spatio-temporal correlation within a single-user trajectory, the data utility optimization is not achieved for a given privacy budget.
In sum, although there are several literatures dealing with the privacy problem of temporal correlations, none of them presents a rigorous mathematical Laplace noise mechanism under the Pufferfish privacy framework that is proved to be ε-differentially private. What's more, to the best of our knowledge, there is no rigorous analytical formula of the noise scale parameters to achieve the optimal data utility, for a given privacy budget. Thus in this paper, we propose such Laplace noise mechanism through adding noise in the daily trajectory's Fourier coefficients, satisfying ε-Pufferfish privacy, in order to protect temporal correlations against inferencing attacks.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the statement of our problem and the basic idea of our mechanism. Then, we introduce some basic concepts, including Pufferfish privacy, Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) and Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform (IDFT), geometric sum, and the constrained optimization problem. To start, Table 1 lists some key variables used across this paper with their explanations. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND BASIC IDEA
Our goal is to protect the temporal correlation of a user's daily trajectories from being related to a user's daily trajectories pattern and thus the user's privacy, when combined with other prior knowledge about the user. First, let's define the daily trajectory of a user as follows.
Definition 1 (Daily Trajectory):
The daily trajectory of a user u m on the d-th day, denoted as T, is a sequence of locations at N times slots,
where X n and Y n are the longitude and latitude of a user u m at the n-th time slot on the d-th day, respectively; and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , M } and d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}.
A daily trajectory database, denoted by T , contains M users' daily trajectories over D days. When adversaries obtain the database T , they may compute the temporal correlation of every user through ensemble average of the user's daily trajectories over all D days; then the adversaries may compare it with the prior knowledge of a user's temporal correlation. Based on the similarity and other background knowledge, they could identify which temporal correlation belongs to a certain user. Therefore the temporal correlation of a user's daily trajectories should be protected in order to avoid such inferencing attack.
In this paper, we first quantify the temporal correlation in a rigorous mathematics way. Then we propose the FGSPufferfish privacy mechanism by adding noise to the Fourier coefficients through geometric sum. At last, we obtained the rigorous formula of the optimal noisy Fourier coefficients by solving the constrained optimization problem, i.e., achieving the optimal data utility for a given privacy budget.
For the rest of this paper, because the mean or the ensemble average of a user's daily trajectories does not affect our problem treatment, we will only consider the following modified daily trajectory with its mean subtracted:
. Also, we will assume that {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and {y n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} are statistically independent and can be treated individually. What's more, for simplicity, we take the modified longitude daily trajectory {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} as an example to explain our proposed mechanism.
B. BASIC CONCEPTS
Before we go into the details of the temporal correlation privacy issue, let's introduce some basic concepts first, which includes Pufferfish privacy, DFT/IDFT, geometric sum, and the constrained optimization problem.
1) PUFFERFISH PRIVACY
Pufferfish privacy [16] is a mathematics mechanism for privacy and its definition is given as below, Definition 2 (Pufferfish Privacy): A random mechanism M is said to be ε-Pufferfish private in a framework (C, Q, ) if for the data C drawn from all possible belief distributions θ ∈ of an adversary, the following condition is satisfied for all secret pairs C (u) , C (v) ∈ Q, and all C ∈ Range{M (C ∈ C)},
2) DISCRETE FOURIER TRANSFORM
Now let's look at the DFT of a user's daily trajectory.
Definition 3 (Discrete Fourier Transform):
The discrete Fourier transform transforms a user's daily trajectory x n n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 into a set of sine and cosine waves of different frequencies and corresponding Fourier coefficients F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 which is defined as follows,
where j = √ −1; N and K are the total number of time slots and Fourier coefficients, respectively.
In this paper, we assume that both the real part F r k and the imaginary part F i k of the Fourier coefficient F k follow the same Gaussian distribution with mean µ k = 0 and the VOLUME 6, 2018 standard deviation of σ S k , and the probability distribution of {F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1} is as follows,
, and its power spectrum S k = |F k | 2 follows the Chi-Square χ 2 2 distribution with a degree of 2, which is also the exponential distribution,
On the contrary, a trajectory for a given Fourier coefficients set of length K can be expressed by the IDFT, and its definition is given as follows.
Definition 4 (Inverse Discrete Fourier Transform):
The inverse discrete Fourier transform transforms the Fourier coefficients F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 into the daily trajectory x n n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 which is defined as follows,
3) GEOMETRIC SUM
Geometric sum [30] can achieve noise Laplace distribution through sum of a random K -series of random variables F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and its definition is as follows, Definition 5 (Geometric Sum): Let F k k = 0, 1, · · · , K − 1 be a sequence of independent random variables (but not necessarily identically distributed), their geometric sum is defined as,
with K following the geometric distribution,
, then the geometric sum F weakly follows the Laplace distribution [30] ,
under the conditions of
, for some 0 < α < 1;
and for all ξ > 0:
4) THE CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The constrained optimization problem is a strategy of finding the local extrema (maxima and minima) of a function f (b) subject to equality constraint g(b) = 0. The constrained optimization problem is given below,
with the following Lagrangian,
which can be solved by the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) method when the following conditions are satisfied,
IV. TEMPORAL CORRELATION AND MOBILITY PATTERN
In this section, we show that relation between the user's mobility pattern of a user and its temporal correlation C of the user's daily trajectories; then we show that its Fourier coefficients S k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 is closely related to the variance of the Fourier coefficients of a user over all D days,
A. MOBILITY PATTERN
The user's mobility pattern can be described by the conditional probability of the next i-th location from the current n-th location, i.e., Pr (x n+i |x n ). Also, for Markov process, the conditional probability of the current location depends only on its last location, i.e., Pr x n+i |x n+i−1 ,
B. TEMPORAL CORRELATION
The temporal correlation C describes the relation among different locations within a user's daily trajectories {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N −1} through the conditional transition probability Pr (x n+i |x n ), i.e., the mobility pattern. It is the ensemble average of a user's daily trajectories {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} over all D days and each user has one and only one C. Definition 6 (Temporal Correlation): A user's temporal correlation of length I , denoted by C, depicts the relation between two locations at current time slot t n and its following i-th time slots t n+i , and its definition is as below:
with C i being the ensemble average of the locations pair at time slots (t n+i , t n ), denoted as (x n+i , x n ), over all days,
From Lemma 2 in Appendix B, it can be shown that, the Fourier coefficients of C is the variance of the Fourier coefficients of a user's daily trajectories over all days, i.e.,
where
If the trajectories set follows the ergodic process, the ensemble average of the temporal correlation is equivalent to an autocorrelation function within a single daily trajectory,
x n+i x n .
C. THE DFT OF THE TEMPORAL CORRELATION
The DFT coefficients of a user's temporal correlation C, denoted as S k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 , is obtained from Eq. (4),
For ergodic trajectories, we also have,
where F k is the k-th DFT coefficient of the user's daily trajectories given in Definition 3.
V. THE FGS-PUFFERFISH PRIVACY MECHANISM
In this section, we present a noise mechanism based on the geometric sum of the Fourier coefficients and optimize the data utility for a given privacy budget.
A. THE SETTING 1) TEMPORAL CORRELATION SECRET
For our problem, the Pufferfish secrets set consists of temporal correlations of all user given in Definition 6, denoted by C, and it is expressed as follows,
2) CORRELATION SECRETS PAIRS
A correlation secrets pair consists of two temporal correlations of any two users u and v in the same database, denoted as Q,
3) THE ADVERSARY'S BELIEF DISTRIBUTION
The adversary's belief distribution θ is the probability of the temporal correlation C, = {θ : Pr (C)}.
B. NOISE MECHANISM
From Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), we know that the Fourier coefficients of the temporal correlation C are closely related to those of the daily trajectory. Thus it is natural to add noise to the Fourier coefficients of the trajectory. Actually, Rastogi and Nath [11] proposed a similar noise mechanism, i.e., the so-called FPA approach, based on the noisy Fourier coefficients mechanism. Unfortunately, the FPA approach considers neither the temporal correlation issue, nor the data utility optimization problem.
In this paper, we propose to optimize the Fourier coefficients noise for the problem of temporal correlation privacy. First, we add the noise in the Fourier coefficients F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 shown in Definition 3; then, we obtain the generated noisy daily trajectory {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} according to the IDFT given in Definition 4, with the noisy Fourier coefficients F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 ; and finally, the noisy temporal correlation C is obtained from the noisy daily trajectory {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} according to Definition 6.
1) THE FOURIER COEFFICIENTS NOISE MECHANISM
In the Fourier coefficients noise mechanism, we add the noise into the Fourier coefficient, and we have,
The Fourier coefficients noise mechanism does not require specific probability distribution of δF k k = 0, 1, · · ·, K −1 , as long as they are mutual independent. However, to have minimum K to achieve Laplace distribution of the geometric sum, a natural choice is the Laplace distribution for both the real part and imaginary part of the noisy Fourier coefficients, i.e., δF r k , δF i k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 ,
where we have only shown the set of real parts due to the similarity and assumed that both the set of real parts δF r k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 and the set of imaginary parts δF i k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 have the same Laplace noise scale parameter b F k . Also, we have the following Laplace properties,
2) LAPLACE LOCATION NOISE
After the addition of Fourier coefficients noise, the noisy location becomes,
Theorem 2:
The noisy location via the Fourier coefficients noise mechanism has a Laplace probability distribution given by,
Proof: With the help of Theorem 1, Lemma 1 in Appendix A shows that each noisy location x n follows the Laplace distribution with the mean of E{x n } = x n and the same scale parameter b x = b x n . So the noisy daily trajectory {x n n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1} has a joint Laplace distribution and Theorem 2 is proved.
3) LAPLACE TEMPORAL CORRELATION NOISE
Theorem 3: The noisy temporal correlation C has a joint Laplace probability distribution given by,
and
where C i |i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 is a set of the mean of the temporal correlation C before noise is added; and δC i |i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 is a set of the noise induced change of the mean of temporal correlation C.
Proof: From Lemma 3 (see Appendix C), we know that each C i follows the Laplace distribution with the scale parameter b C i . Thus the temporal correlation C = {C i i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1} has a joint probability distribution and Theorem 3 is proved.
C. THE CONSTRAINED OPTIMIZATION OF THE FGS-PUFFERFISH PRIVACY MECHANISM
In this section, we propose to achieve the optimal data utility for a given privacy budget, i.e., the constrained optimization problem. We resort to the LM method for such constrained optimization of the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism.
Before the constrained optimization problem, let's quantify the data utility. Here we consider two utilities, including the location utility and the correlation utility. This is because, on one hand, the location utility is important for location based services such as location recommendation; and on the other hand, the correlation utility is important for applications such as location forecasting.
For the location utility, we want the average noisy location deviates from its raw location as small as possible and is defined as its variance given below, Definition 7 (Location Utility): The location utility, denoted by U L , is the average variance of noisy locations x n n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 after the noise is added. We have,
For the correlation utility, we want the mean of the noisy temporal correlationsC i deviates from its raw value C i as small as possible, which is defined as follows,
Definition 8 (Correlation Utility):
The correlation utility, denoted by U C , is the average of the deviation of the noisy correlationC i from its raw value C i , denoted as δC i = C i − C i , over its correlation length of I . From Theorem 3, we have,
Now let's define the data utility through the location utility and the correlation utility. And its definition is as follow.
Definition 9 (Data Utility):
The data utility, denoted by U, is the weighted sum of both the location utility U L and the correlation utility U C , and its definition is as below,
2 W i,k , with w ∈ [0, 1] being the weight of the location utility U L . It is well-known that the privacy budget ε is inversely proportional to the Laplace noise scale parameter, i.e., the larger the Laplace noise scale parameter, the smaller the privacy budget ε or the better the privacy protection. For such reason, let's look at the Laplace noise scale parameters set b C = b C i i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 . According to Theorem 3, b C has minimum value at b C 0 . So we only need to consider b C 0 when dealing with the constrained optimization problem,
Now we can simplify the LM method in Eq. (3) for the constrained optimization problem of the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism, with the help of Theorem 3,
with the Lagrangian of
From Lemma 4 in Appendix D, the optimal Fourier noise sale parameters b * 
VI. ANALYSIS
In this section, we give the analysis of the data utility, privacy and the adversary knowledge.
A. UTILITY
According to the Eq. (11), as shown at the top of the next page, and the data utility given in Definition 9, we have the optimal data utility as below,
B. PRIVACY
First, let's look at the measure of the temporal correlation for the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism. A temporal correlation measure, denoted by M (C), is the joint probability distribution of the noisy temporal correlation C after noise is added,
Pr(C i ).
Theorem 4:
The Fourier coefficients noise mechanism satisfies ε-Pufferfish privacy of the noisy temporal correlation C for a given noise scale parameter b C ,
with ε = ε 0 + , where
Proof: From Theorem 3, we have,
from which we have,
So the privacy budget ε is obtained by taking the maximum difference of the probability ratios for all pairs of trajectories
and Theorem 4 is proved. VOLUME 6, 2018
C. ADVERSARY KNOWLEDGE Our goal is to prevent an adversary from mining a user's privacy through analyzing the user's temporal correlation based on the adversary's prior knowledge about the user. A good privacy mechanism requires that the adversary's posterior-to-prior knowledge gain should be close to unit 1. Mathematically, the adversary's knowledge gain is given by the ratio of the posterior probability Pr(C ∼ 0|C) to the prior probability Pr(C ∼ 0), given that the adversary has known the raw daily trajectory correlation of the user C (u) .
1) PRIOR KNOWLEDGE
Without any knowledge of the correlation of a user C (u) , the adversary might uniformly pick C. From Lemma 3 (see Appendix C), the adversary's prior knowledge is given by,
2) POSTERIOR KNOWLEDGE Given that the adversary has known the user's temporal correlation C (u) , the adversary's posterior knowledge is given by,
3) POSTERIOR-OVER-PRIOR KNOWLEDGE GAIN
Now, let's look at the posterior-over-prior knowledge gain of an adversary.
Theorem 5:
The posterior-over-prior knowledge gain of an adversary satisfies
Proof: From Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), we have,
From Theorem 4, we have,
and Theorem 5 is proved.
VII. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING TRAJECTORIES RELEASING
In this section, we summarize our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism and present the numerical recipe of the privacypreserving daily trajectory releasing algorithm. The basic reasoning of the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism is as follows:
1) First, we define the constrained optimization problem of achieving a better data utility U * for a given privacy budget given by the Laplace scale parameter of C 0 , i.e., b C 0 . 2) Next, we solve the constrained optimization problem via the LM method and obtain the optimal obtained Laplace scale parameter b * 3) Then, the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism adds noise to the Fourier coefficients according to Eq. (7) and obtain the noisy Fourier coefficients, i.e., F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 . 4) At last, we obtain the sanitized daily trajectories x n , y n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 according to Eq. (2), with the noisy Fourier coefficients F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 . Based our proposed FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism, we design an algorithm to release temporally correlated trajectories in order to protect individuals' privacy. Because our goal is to protect the temporal correlation of a user's daily trajectory, we first calculate the Fourier coefficients {F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1} of a daily trajectory {x n |n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, which is related to the Fourier coefficients {S k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1} of its temporal correlation C. Then, to achieve the Laplace distribution of the noisy temporal correlation C through the Fourier coefficients noise mechanism, i.e., adding noise to K Fourier coefficients, with K following the geometric distribution. Furthermore, we obtain the optimal Laplace scale parameters b * F k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 for the noisy Fourier coefficients. Finally, we use IDFT to obtain the noisy locations of the sanitized daily trajectory. The details of the privacy-preserving trajectory releasing through the FGSPufferfish privacy mechanism is given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 FGS-Pufferfish Private Trajectory Releasing
Input: A raw daily trajectories set:
. . , D , and a given Laplace scale parameter of C 0 : b C 0 . Output: A privacy-preserving trajectories set:
Calculate the ensemble average of (X n , Y n ).
4:
for all d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D} do 5: Obtain the modified daily trajectory of the d-th day: (x n , y n ) n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 , where x n = X n − X n and y n = Y n −Y n (only {x n n = 0, 1, . . . , N −1} is shown).
6:
Calculate the Fourier coefficients for the modified longitude:
Select an appropriate p and obtain K through the geometric distribution:
Select the utility weight w and calculate W k :
Calculate the optimal Laplace scale parameter for the noisy Fourier coefficients:
.
10:
Obtain noisy Fourier coefficients
for all n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} do 12: Obtain the noisy location x n through IDFT:
N kn .
13:
end for 14: Obtain the noisy modified daily trajectory:
15:
∪ x n +X n , y n +Ȳ n n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 .
16:
end for 17: end for 18: 
VIII. EVALUATION A. EVALUATION SETTING 1) CONFIGURATIONS
We implement our simulations with Python 2.7 on a laptop with Intel Core i7-6500U, 2.59GHz, Windows 10 system equipped with 8GB main memory. The trajectories' temporal correlations are evaluated at time intervals of t i = iτ i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 , with τ being a constant, as required by the DFT and IDFT. Also, all simulations are for the data utility U that consists of w = 90% location utility U L and 1 − w = 10% correlation utility U C . What's more, due to similarity, only the result for the location utility U L is shown.
2) DATA
We compare our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism to the CTS approach [3] on both simulated and real-life data [32] . Because the real-life data is not sampled at a constant time interval τ , we interpolate the raw data in order that the obtained data has a constant time interval τ .
a: SIMULATED DATA
The simulated data is consist of temporally correlated simulated trajectories which are generated through updating the current location x n at the n-th time slot by keeping only a fraction of the last location x n−1 , while adding a random location change g that follows the Gaussian distribution, i.e., x n = C 1 x n−1 + g 1 − C 2 1 , with C 1 = exp −1/τ c being the temporal correlation at i = 1 and τ c is the correlation time constant. The generated daily trajectory has an exponential temporal correlation of C i = exp −i/τ c . This data contains 9 trajectories, and each daily trajectory consists of 32 time slots with a constant time interval. For both our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism and the CTS approach, 1,000,000 noise realizations are used for statistics.
b: REAL DATA
The real data is collected by Yonsei University in Seoul of Korea. It contains nine users' mobility trajectories in 62 days. A daily trajectory in this dataset consists of longitudes x n , latitudes y n and timestamps t. After an interpolation with a constant time interval, each user's daily trajectory has 48 times slots. Similar to the simulated dataset, we used 1,000,000 noise realizations for statistics.
3) METRICS
During our evaluations, firstly, we evaluate the probability distribution for noisy temporal correlations, due to similarity reason, we only show the result of Pr(C 0 ). Then, we focus on other two metrics of performance: privacy and utility.
In the previous analysis, we have proved that our mechanism satisfies ε-Pufferfish privacy. Hence, we adopt the privacy budget ε to evaluate the privacy. For the privacy budget ε, we use the joint probability for all coefficients C i i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 of the correlation function C , i.e., Pr(C ) in Eq. (9) .
Furthermore, for the location utility evaluation, we adopt the utility of the average location standard deviation of a daily trajectory U L = σ L in Definition 9 to measure the data utility. VOLUME 6, 2018 B. SIMULATED DATA We first generate correlated trajectories with an exponential temporal correlation. Then we evaluate the probability distribution of the noisy temporal correlation Pr(C 0 ) as shown in Figure 2 . It is clear that the distribution Pr(C 0 ) of our proposed FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism is a symmetric Laplace distribution, agreeing with Theorem 3, while the probability distribution Pr(C 0 ) of the CTS approach is neither symmetric and nor a Laplace distribution. 
1) PRIVACY EVALUATION FOR SIMULATED DATA
Now, let's see the privacy budget ε. As we know, the smaller the privacy budget ε, the better the privacy. The experimental results are shown in Figure 3 , from which it is clear that our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism does achieve better privacy than the CTS approach, for given location utilities U = σ L . 
2) UTILITY EVALUATION FOR SIMULATED DATA
Now, let's look at the location utility U L under the same privacy budget ε. As shown in Figure 4 , the location utility U L of our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism is better than that of the CTS approach. Also, we can see that the smaller the privacy budget ε, the better the location utility U L . 
C. REAL DATA
For real-life data, we evaluate the longitude coordinate x n and the latitude coordinate y n independently. Similar to the simulated data, we first evaluate the probability distribution Pr C x,0 and Pr C y,0 of the temporal correlations after noise is added, and the results as shown in Figure 5 for Pr C x,0 and Figure 6 for Pr C y,0 . Similar to the simulated data, both Pr C x,0 and Pr C y,0 of our proposed FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism are symmetric Laplace distributions, agreeing with Theorem 3, while those of the CTS approach are not. 
1) PRIVACY EVALUATION FOR REAL DATA
Now let's look at the privacy budgets ε x and ε y . As shown in the Figure 7 and Figure 8 , the privacy budgets ε x and ε y of our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism are smaller than those of the CTS approach for the same given data utilities U x x and U x y . Also, both approaches show that the privacy is better for a worse data utility, and vice versa.
2) UTILITY EVALUATION FOR REAL DATA
Similar to the simulated data, we have also evaluated the location utilities U x x and U x y under the same privacy budget ε x and ε y , which are shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 . Again, it is clear that our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism achieves better location utility for the same given privacy budgets ε x and ε y . 
IX. CONCLUSION
We propose a Laplace noise mechanism based on the noisy Fourier coefficients' geometric sum, satisfying Pufferfish privacy, i.e., the FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism, to protect the temporal correlation of a user's daily trajectories. The optimal noisy Fourier coefficients are obtained by solving the constrained optimization problem via the LM method to achieves a better data utility for a given privacy budget. Experiments with both simulated and real-life data show that our FGS-Pufferfish privacy mechanism achieves better data utility and privacy compared to the existing approach. Although we only deal with daily trajectories with a constant time interval, our proposed mechanism can be readily modified for time-series data with irregular time intervals. At last, the geometric sum can be combined with other decomposition methods such as Principal Components VOLUME 6, 2018 Analysis (PCA) and wavelets methods for better performance of specific time-series applications.
APPENDIX A NOISY LOCATION PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Lemma 1: After noise is added to the Fourier coefficients, the noisy location's Laplace distribution is given by
Proof: From Theorem 1, we know that x n follows the Laplace distribution, and its mean E x n and Laplace scale parameter b x n are given by,
from which Lemma 1 is proved.
APPENDIX B TEMPORAL CORRELATION OF A USER
Lemma 2: The temporal correlation of a user before noise is added, denoted as C, is the Fourier transform of the variance of the Fourier coefficients of the user's daily trajectories over all D days, i.e.,
Proof: From Eq. (2), we have,
where we have used the property of the Chi-Square χ 2 2 distribution in Eq. (1) and thus Lemma 2 is proved.
APPENDIX C NOISY TEMPORAL CORRELATION DISTRIBUTION
Similar to the noisy location distribution, we can obtain the noisy temporal correlation distribution according to the geometric sum given in Theorem 1.
Lemma 3: The noisy temporal correlation coefficient C i follows the Laplace distribution,
Proof: Similar to Lemma 2, the noisy temporal correlation C i i = 0, 1, · · · , I − 1 after the Fourier coefficients noise mechanism can be obtained,
We can see that C i in Eq. (14) is in the form of geometric sum. From Theorem 1, we know that C i i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 follows Laplace distribution. With the help of the properties of the Laplace Fourier coefficients noise δF k k = 0, 1, . . . , K − 1 given in Eq. (8), the mean of the noisy temporal correlation coefficients C i i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1 after the Fourier coefficients noise mechanism is given by,
whereC i is the mean of the temporal correlation before noise is added; and δC i is the noise induced change of the mean of the temporal correlation C,
Now let's calculateC i and δC i ,
Similarly, we have,
We can also obtain the variance of C i (i = 0, 1, . . . , I − 1) as follows,
where we have used the property of the Laplace distribution of Var (K ,δF k ) C i = 2 b 2
C i
and Lemma 3 is proved.
APPENDIX D THE OPTIMAL FOURIER COEFFICIENTS NOISE SCALE PARAMETERS
Lemma 4: The optimal Fourier coefficients noise scale parameters for the constrained optimization problem of data utility U for a given privacy budget ε given in Eq. (10) First, let's express b * 2 F as a function of λ * ,
Then, let's substitute Eq. (16) 
